Are we ready for the next 26/11?

Sohel Sanghani
23 November 2012, 05:42 PM IST

Kasab's hanging has brought some degree of closure to the horrific Mumbai attacks. Yet the larger question of what India's response should be in the hours and days after the next major attack remains unanswered.

Our Prime Minister and his cabinet discovered in 2001-02 that mobilizing the entire army in response to the attack on Parliament was not the best strategy. Weeks passed before the formidable 'Strike Corps' were in position to launch an assault. This had allowed Pakistan to mobilize its own army and firm up its defenses. Had India gone ahead with the assault, what would have followed is a grinding war of attrition where progress would be slow and losses heavy on both sides. And even this would be the best case, for it ignores the possibility of nuclear escalation.

Part of the reason for the delay was the scale of deployment, numbering over 5 lakh troops, which was guided by the Sundarji (Rajiv Gandhi era) doctrine of massive conventional retaliation. The delay in mobilization allowed international diplomatic pressure to pile up against any Indian military response. Senior American officials were shuttling between New Delhi and Islamabad to try and prevent war, for this would have jeopardized their own efforts in Afghanistan.

A need was thus felt for a faster, nimbler mobilization that leads to limited action before Pakistani defenses or international diplomatic pressure have had time to kick in. Today, some call this 'Cold Start', while others deny its existence. The plan is to have smaller, division-sized units mobilize rapidly and capture limited Pakistani territory that can be used as leverage in subsequent negotiations. It's a nice idea, but faces two challenges.

The first is whether we can pull it off at all – do we have the requisite equipment, training and leadership talent to acquire and hold territory against a determined foe at short notice? The second, and perhaps more important question is if Pakistan will resist using nuclear weapons if we launch Cold Start. Their recent testing of short-range missiles that will carry smaller warheads suggests a hot end to our advancing columns. Whether they have the capability and willingness to attack Indian divisions moving close to Pakistani towns and other population centers is uncertain.

So what else can we do? The idea of 'surgical strikes' by the Indian Air Force on terror camps in Pakistan was brandished in the wake of the Mumbai attacks. This may have been possible if these camps were near the border. The Sukhoi Su-30MKI, our flagship fighter-bomber is a very potent weapon. It has a long range (can be refueled mid-air), can carry a large payload and is an excellent dogfighter to boot. But what if the targets are deep inside Pakistan? Say around Karachi, as Pakistani officials have recently admitted was the case with the Mumbai perpetrators. We do not have stealth aircraft that can penetrate Pakistani airspace undetected. The Sukhoi, like other aircraft in the IAF's inventory, is a very blunt instrument of war whose effective deployment may lead to escalation. Hence an air strike launched from the land is inherently risky.

So how about the sea? Our sole aircraft carrier, the INS Viraat is barely afloat and Pakistani F-16s may overwhelm the handful of Sea Harriers that it carries. An aircraft carrier battle group would also be an attractive target for both tactical nuclear and conventional strikes.

So it would seem that using our superior air and land forces is tricky. Indeed this is likely what has held us back in the past – are 100-200 civilian deaths a just cause for launching a war that could be far more costly in terms of human lives? Perhaps not. But this does not mean that we should continue to present a soft target. The use of force remains viable and deserves further exploration by our political leaders. There are other ways through which India can raise the cost of Pakistani misbehavior, to include acts of terror.

One possible option is to do what Israel did in the wake of the terrorist attack on its athletes during the Munich Olympics. Israeli intelligence agencies and special forces systematically targeted and eliminated all those who were involved in the planning and execution of the attacks. There is no reason why RAW cannot emulate this if it is provided sufficient resources. Indian agents must already be deployed in Pakistan (at least one hopes that they are), and they should be leveraged to the fullest extent possible.

A second tactic could be interdicting Pakistani naval trade and supplies (including oil). The Indian Navy is a much stronger and better-equipped force and should be instructed to selectively sink Pakistani ships, to include merchant vessels. This should be done in a dispersed and unpredictable manner so that at no time can Pakistan use a nuclear weapon to sink a large part of our fleet. The pressure on Pakistan's weak economy will be severe and it should be sustained till the perpetrators of the attack are willfully handed over. Longer-range ship-based cruise missiles (like the Nirbhay, currently under development) should also be used to strike at targets within Pakistan.
Their distinctive trajectory and smaller size makes them unlikely to be confused with ballistic nuclear missiles, preventing miscalculation.

A third tactic could be to reply in kind – there is much dissent within the Pakistani terror apparatus and India could assist rebel groups in their plans within Pakistan. But fighting terror with terror is not in our character and it also raises the risk of losing the high moral ground that we continue to enjoy in the international community.

In the long term, we should endeavor to develop both viable stealth technology as well as an offensive drone program that can operate out of bases in Afghanistan, much as the American program is doing today. Taking out non-state actors, including state-supported outfits like the Lashkar-e-Taiba needs to be done in a precise, low-intensity manner that does not threaten the survival of the Pakistani state, but raises the cost of adopting terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

It is the duty of every government to ensure the security of the people it serves. The Indian people will justifiably demand a visible and effective response after the next major attack. It is of course heartening to see that a growing number of leaders on both sides recognize that peace is the only viable long-term option. But as we have learnt repeatedly over the years, the best course for us is to plan for the worst, even as we hope for the best.